Abstract Using Bayesian methods, we re-examine the empirical evidence from Ben-David, 
Introduction
In this paper we re-examine the empirical findings of Ben-David, Lumsdaine and Pappell (2003) , hereafter BLP, regarding structural changes in the long-run trend of output series using a Bayesian approach.
1 They extended the one break model of Ben-David and Papell (1995) to two structural breaks, and rejected the unit root hypothesis in aggregate and per capita GDP for more than half of 16 OECD countries.
The two structural break model allowed them to discuss the causes of the postwar growth slowdowns. They found that while most countries experienced postwar slowdowns in output, they also exhibited faster growth following the second structural break. Such increasing growth over the long run is consistent with the predictions of Romer-type endogenous growth models. The analysis in BLP is conditional on imposing two structural breaks and on the form of the broken trend function.
2 However, they provided no formal justification for why output should only experience exactly two breaks over the last century or why the specification of the trend functions for certain output series should be different. In addition, they did not consider the possibility that the variability of aggregate output may have changed over time.
Indeed, several studies (e.g. Wang and Zivot, 2000; Murray and Nelson, 2002) have documented volatility changes in output series and have shown that changes in output volatility can be confused with changes in trend. Our goal in this paper is to see if the main results of BLP remain intact if we let the data determine the number and form of the breaks in the output series.
nonstationary and trend stationary data, and allows for exact finite-sample inferences.
Second, Bayesian inference allows for non-nested model comparisons in a straightforward way which can be used to determine the number and form of structural changes appropriate for a given series. Finally, the Bayesian methodology incorporates model and parameter uncertainty explicitly.
Our empirical analysis gives comparable results to BLP's regarding multiple breaks in the long-run growth paths of countries. The most important distinction is the number and form of the breaks in the output series adopted for analysis. We find various numbers of structural breaks ranging from one to five in our Bayesian approach, whereas BLP fixed the number of breaks at two. Furthermore, unlike in BLP who assumed a constant variance for each output series, we find that the majority of countries have undergone breaks in variance as well as in level and trend.
Our results agree with the findings in BLP that all of the countries have at least one break associated with a World War or the Depression, but we provide stronger evidence for the interruption of growth paths among the OECD countries by both wars. Also, we do not find evidence of postwar slowdowns caused by oil price shocks in the 1970s. Only one of the postwar breaks falls within the period of 1973-75 while the rest occur earlier. In general, we find little evidence of postwar growth slowdowns across countries and we find smaller output volatility for most of the developed countries after the end of World War II. Regarding long-run growth paths, our results confirm the findings in BLP that most of the industrialized countries experienced faster growth in the latter years of the sample than during the early years. These results on sustained increasing growth are compatible with the predictions of Romer (1986).
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 review the Bayesian methodology of WZ that we use to model multiple structural breaks in level, trend and variance of international output series. Section 4 provides our empirical findings on the growth path of aggregate and per capita real GDP among 16 OECD industrialized countries and compares these results to those from BLP and other studies. Section 5 summarizes our estimates of the long-run growth behavior of the countries and gives a comparative analysis of the cross-country experience. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
Econometric Methodology
We assume the series of interest y t is regime-wise trend stationary and is modeled 
Equations (1) and (2) can be expressed in a matrix form as:
where ( )
Bayesian Inference
In this section, we briefly describe the Bayesian framework of WZ adopted in this study.
Prior Specification
We assume that the vectors k, B and σ 2 are mutually independent and that the elements of σ 2 are independent. For the specification of the prior beliefs about unknown parameters, we use proper priors for k, B and σ 2 . The break points, k, are assumed to follow a discrete uniform distribution over all ordered subsequences of (2,3,...,T) of length of m. This is a diffuse prior which does not impose any information about the location of the break dates. With regard to the remaining parameters, we employ natural conjugate priors. The prior distribution of B in equation (3) is given by a multivariate normal (MVN) distribution,
, where B 0 and Σ B are the prior mean and prior covariance matrix of B, respectively. The prior for σ 2 specifies that each element follows an independent inverted Gamma (IG) distribution. That is, for each regime i (i = 1,..., m+1),
To represent a diffuse prior, we set B 0 = 0, ν 0 = 1.001, δ 0 = .001, and Σ B equal to a diagonal matrix with each diagonal element equal to 1,000.
Gibbs-Sampling Algorithm
The posterior distributions of the parameters are derived using the Gibbs sampler (Geman and Geman 1984; Casella and George 1992; Gelman et al. 1995; Chib and Greenberg 1996) . The basic idea of the Gibbs sampler is to approximate the joint and marginal posterior distributions by sampling from conditional distributions. Given the full conditionals ( | , )
where θ -i denotes the vector of θ excluding the element θ i , the Gibbs-sampling algorithm allows us to draw samples of θ iteratively from the full conditional densities.
After sufficient iteration, the draws of these random variables will converge to the target posterior distribution ( | ) f θ Y , and the marginal distribution of θ i can be approximated by the empirical distribution of the draws.
To ensure that a chain has converged, we follow the guidelines of McCulloch and Rossi (1994) , who demonstrated that the posterior distributions with trace plots can be said to converge if the estimated densities do not vary substantially after an initial burn-in period (so that the starting point has less influence on the chain). In our study, these diagnostics show that convergence can be reached after a burn-in period of 500
iterations.
Before proceeding with the Gibbs sampler, we first describe the full conditionals of the unknown parameters. WZ show that for a given break date, k i , the sample space only depends on the neighboring break points k i-1 and k i+1 . Accordingly, the posterior conditional density of k i is of the form:
where i = 1,..., m. The breakpoint k i can be drawn from a multinomial distribution with a sample size parameter equal to the number of dates between k i-1 and k i+1 and probability parameter proportional to the likelihood function. For the posterior conditional distribution of B, the normal prior for B combined with the normal likelihood of (4) yields a MVN conditional posterior: Given the full conditionals (5)- (7), the Gibbs-sampling algorithm can be iterated J times to obtain a vector sample of size J such that ( )
, , 
Posterior Estimation
In order to generate the simulated draws from the Gibbs sampler, we use the method of one long run in the MCMC algorithm suggested by Geyer (1992) . Specifically,
given N = n 0 + n 1 iterations in the Markov chain, we only keep n 1 simulated samples for further inference by discarding the first n 0 sample as a burn-in. However, the output of the Gibbs sampler is a dependent sequence of parameter values forming a Markov chain. As a result, the series is serially correlated but stationary and ergodic.
10
Then given ) , , , (
post-convergent sample draws, the sample mean of these values can be used to estimate the posterior mean:
9 Details of the Gibbs sampler for the structural break models are described in WZ. The C and Gauss codes for implementing Gibbs sampler were kindly provided by Jiahui Wang and Eric Zivot. 10 In practice there are two other remedies to produce independent sequence. The first method is to thin the chain by taking every kth sample to reach approximate independence. However, this approach can result in sub-optimal output (MacEachern and Berliner 1994). Another way is to batch the standard error estimates (Ripley 1987; Geyer 1992) . Although the batching provides better estimates, it is complicated to implement in the context of time series. .
In addition, the Newey-West covariance matrix estimator that is consistent in the presence of both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation:
where $ j Γ is the jth-order sample autocovariance of θ i from n 1 simulated draws and q is an integer of the truncation lag such that q = 4(n 1 / 100) 1/4 , can be used to estimate the variance of the posterior mean.
Model Selection
The Bayesian framework provides a natural way of determining the number and form of structural breaks as a model selection problem. WZ used several model selection criteria to determine the number and type of structural changes. Specifically, they used marginal likelihoods, posterior odds ratios and Schwarz's Bayes information criterion (BIC) to select the model with the most appropriate pattern of structural breaks that best describes the data-generating process of the series. Based on a set of Monte Carlo experiments they found that model selection based on maximizing the BIC performed the best, 11 and so we use the BIC to select the best structural change model for the aggregate output series.
The BIC for a model with m breaks is defined as:
where the likelihood function of L(⋅|⋅) is equation (4) 
Empirical Findings
The data used in this paper are based on the output series compiled by Maddison (1991) . 13 The dataset contains annual GDP data for 16 industrialized countries ranging from 1860 to 1989, and annual per capital GDP data beginning in 1870 due to the availability of the population data. 14 All the series are log transformed for the analysis. Since output is clearly trending, two designs of structural break models (Designs I and II) which involve breaks in the linear deterministic trend are considered for this study.
We first present the empirical evidence for structural breaks in U.S. real GDP as an example. 15 The number of lags for the estimation of (1) and (2) is chosen based on the BIC criterion from an ordinary least squares estimation without assuming structural breaks. For most series, the BIC indicates one lag models. 16 In order to 12 Notice that our definition of the BIC is different from that used in WZ; in other words, the BIC they defined was the negative version of ours. Therefore, they selected the model with the smallest BIC value. 13 The dataset was kindly provided by David Papell. Table 2 shows the posterior means of the estimated parameters, followed by the unconditional means based on the estimates in the second column using the autoregressive parameter. The fourth and fifth columns summarize the standard deviations and medians associated with the estimates, respectively. The last two columns report the 2.5% and 97.5%
posterior quantiles of the parameters. The last row presents the posterior mode for the break years. Finally, Figure 1 plots the posterior distribution of the break years with the real GDP series superimposed. As can be readily seen from the plot, the two structural breaks most likely occurred in 1930 and in 1948 with the highest posterior probability being around .82 and .33, respectively. The parameter estimates suggest a takeoff in the growth rate after the break associated with the Great Depression and that higher growth is associated with higher volatility. During the post-WWII period, there was a significant decline in volatility of the U.S. real GDP, as the posterior mean of σ 3 was nearly one-quarter of σ 2 . 18 These results echo those reported by Nelson (2000, 2002) on the same data, where they showed the U.S. output swung in 1930 and then switched off in 1946, heterogeneity due to the volatile period of the Depression followed by the fading-out phase of the post WWII was governed by a Markov process.
With regard to the U.S. per capita real GDP, the same procedures are applied as For all countries, the most preferred structural break models for real GDP and real per capita GDP are summarized in It is of interest to compare our findings on the timing of breaks with BLP, who estimated endogenous two-break models, which only allow breaks in the intercept and the slope of the trend function, on the same data we use. 20 In their study, the wars are the major events to cause the breaks for most of the OECD countries (especially for all of the continental European countries). 21 The United States was the only country severely affected by the Great Depression. On the other hands, our results indicate Canada was also plagued by the economic downturn. In fact, both North American countries seem to share common shocks as the occurrence of their breaks were during, or in close proximity to, the Great Depression and World War II. Furthermore, our empirical findings provide stronger evidence for the interruption of growth paths among the OECD countries by both wars. For example, with regard to per capita real GDP, two-thirds of countries were affected by both World War I and II, whereas only less than half (the Group B countries) were found in BLP. 22 BLP also find a number of post World War II breaks in the Group A countries. 23 In contrast, we find little 19 In the case of the per capita output, Canada (two breaks), Germany (three breaks), Italy (five breaks), Japan (four breaks), Netherlands (three breaks), and Sweden (two breaks). 20 The ensuing discussions mainly draw from the results of the per capita series. 21 The wars-related breaks are corroborated by the single break study of Raj (1992) , Perron (1994) and Ben-David and Papell (1995 24 One of breaks in Japan's aggregate output was associated with the Depression.
25 Japan had a oil-related break in the real GDP.
26 Nevertheless, the break that Ben-David and Papell (2000) estimated is 6 years earlier than what we found in this study.
We give some explanations for the differences in results between the classical and Bayesian methodologies. First, we do not require breaks be separated by at least five years in the search for potential break dates and we allow for the possibility that an outlier observation can be detected. 27 Second, our model allows changes in variance and this can affect the number and form of structural breaks.
The break points determined by our Bayesian analysis accord closely with intuition and are more objective than the fixed two-break model used in BLP and other studies.
The posterior estimates of the preferred structural break models for aggregate and per capita real GDP are used in the next sub-section to analyze takeoffs and slowdowns.
Growth Implications
Based on the empirical evidence of the structural breaks, the growth implications of the OECD countries can be analyzed to address some common features in terms of the timing of the breaks, regional characteristics and severity of the slowdowns.
From the estimated break dates across 16 countries, the past 130 years (120 years in the case of per capita real GDP) can distinguish eight distinct regimes by the major events in history (Tables 4 and 5) . 28 Each country experienced a subset period of these regimes as the first period begins in 1860 for the aggregate data (1870 for the per capita data) and ends in 1989. 29 The timing and the frequency of the breaks can be used to delineate the 16 industrialized countries into three regional groups, with the twelve countries in continental Europe in one group, two countries in North America and the two remaining countries in the other.
27 A potential outlier is identified by two break dates next to each other. had an average annual growth rate of more than 7% prior to 1970 and then dropped to 3% after the break. In that sense, we confirm the finding in BLP that the oil shock was not the leading cause of the postwar slowdowns from the long-run perspective. 31 As is addressed in Ben-David and Papell (2000) , the collapse of the Bretton Woods system during the early 1970s, along with the concurrent oil price shocks, might jointly contribute to postwar slowdowns. It is also worthwhile to note that the slowdowns in the growth rate do not affect the volatility across the regimes. In fact, for those countries that experienced postwar slowdowns, the volatility in their output tends to remain constant over the long-term time spans.
The evidence on the growth slowdown in our study is consistent with the findings in Ben-David and Papell (2000) for the G7 countries, where only two cases of postwar growth slowdowns were observed. In addition, our analysis extends beyond the G7 countries and shows that most OECD countries do not exhibit a significant postwar break in their growth rates, and finds higher postwar growth for most of the countries than its initial rate prior to the first break. The last column in Table 5 indicates the extent of the postwar slowdowns from the long-run perspective. 32 After the post-WWII slowdown, all of these countries experienced higher average growth rates than they had exhibited prior to their first breaks. In the case of Italy, average final period growth rate was 711 percent of first period rate. Also, final period growth rate in Switzerland was 142 percent of first period rate, and 222 percent higher than prebreak rate in Japan. In general, postwar growth for each of the OECD countries is considerably higher than the growth rate prior to the first break.
In terms of volatility across regimes, we find strong evidence of a more stabilized economy during the postwar era. Contrary to the common perception that the U.S. Focusing on per capita output levels and growth rates, the Second World War had a worldwide impact on the major industrialized countries. Each of the countries (other than Finland and Sweden) experienced a significant structural change after the end of 32 Less evidence of postwar slowdowns was observed in the aggregate series (Table 6) . 33 The studies referred in this paragraph only limit to the U.S. case. In addition, these studies based on postwar data cannot reflect the magnitude of the volatility reduction from a long-run perspective.
the war. 34 The new postwar per capita growth rates of these countries were considerably higher than the baseline rates of growth. In the meantime, there is a significant volatility reduction during the postwar era compared to the baseline levels of volatility. While World War I severely affected the continental European countries (and Japan), the Great Depression resulted in a significant structural break in only two
North American countries and Switzerland. The Great Depression regime for both the United States and Canada was characterized by level drops but trend increases during the following period. In the case of the United States, the drop in level following the 1930 break came along with the average annual growth rate of 6.4% between 1931
and 1947. In the case of Canada, the drop in level boosted the economy to a higher growth rate that averaged 11.6% between 1932 through 1945. Furthermore, the two economies had a distinct reaction to the Great Depression shock. While Canada experienced a lower volatility after the shock, the economic downturn has brought about twice as much as the pre-break level of the variance in the U.S. economy.
Conclusions
Using Bayesian methods we search for the most appropriate structural break specification to model the changes in the growth processes of 16 OECD countries using up to 130 years of annual aggregate and per capita GDP data. Our analysis focuses on three aspects of the structure change models. First, we characterize distinct regimes based on changes in the level, the trend and the variance. Second, we conduct a comparative study of the cross-country experience to establish stylized facts of growth rates. Finally, we make comparisons of empirical findings between years. By comparing the postwar growth rate with the baseline rate, we find that growth rates increased over extended periods of time. In this sense, the evidence of the high postwar growth reflected the high transitional high growth and is compatible with the prediction of the endogenous growth models. (1) and (2) 
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